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How secure is Tor?

Every few months a headline says Tor is broken. This page goes through the attacks on record, what the Tor Project built against each one, and what Aphotic adds on top.

Why this page exists

A fair question deserves a specific answer

Researchers have published real attacks on Tor, and the serious ones have engineering answers. Most "Tor is broken" stories, read closely, describe a badly configured service. Each block below takes one claim, lays out what the record says, and then states what Aphotic does about it.

Onion services have been found, so onion routing must be broken.

What happened

Many of the cases on record come down to mistakes made around the service: a server that also answered at a normal internet address, software that printed its real address in an error page, third-party scripts, an operator who reused a personal email address. The cases that were attacks on Tor itself used guard discovery and timing, which the next blocks cover. None of them involved breaking Tor's encryption.

What Aphotic does

Aphotic's server is set up to rule out the configuration mistakes. It has no normal internet address that could leak. It sits on an internal-only network where the Tor process is the one thing that can reach the outside world, and every incoming port is shut. Replies carry no identifying headers, and even the health check gives away no version number. What the server stores is listed field by field on the transparency page.

Guard-discovery attacks deanonymize onion services.

What happened

This attack is real, and it has worked. Every Tor connection starts at a first hop, called a guard, which is deliberately kept the same for weeks. An attacker who can force a service to keep making new connections can, over time, work out statistically which guard it keeps starting from, and then attack or watch that one machine. It worked best against services that had been running a long time with default settings and no extra protection.

The engineering answer is already deployed. A protection called Vanguards pins the second and third hops to small sets that change slowly, so the statistical narrowing never converges. It also watches for the pattern an attempted attack leaves behind.

What Aphotic does

The server runs the full version of Vanguards, with pinned second and third hops and two watchdogs. One flags meeting points that get picked far more often than chance allows, which is the signature of somebody actively trying this attack. The other flags odd bandwidth patterns and injected junk. Guard choices survive restarts. If the protection process ever dies, the service goes down with it and never carries on unprotected.

Timing and traffic-correlation attacks break Tor anyway.

What's true

This attack means watching both ends of a connection at the same time and matching up the rhythm of the traffic. For ordinary Tor browsing, the exit relay gives an attacker a cheap second place to watch from. Traffic to a hidden service never leaves the Tor network, so there's no exit to sit on. An attacker has to find and watch the specific first hops of both sides simultaneously.

Tor's designers state this limit openly: Tor does not try to beat an attacker who can already see both ends, because the only known defence is adding so much delay that the network becomes unusable. Their work goes into making those two positions hard to reach in the first place, with six hops, first hops that change slowly and on purpose, and no exit side at all for hidden services. Timing gets addressed at that layer, and Aphotic builds on it.

What Aphotic does

Vanguards covers the guard-discovery attacks above. Timing is Tor's job. Aphotic adds no artificial delay to your messages, because a delay added before your message reaches the network shifts both ends of the comparison by the same amount and cancels out of the attacker's calculation, and a delay big enough to help would cost more than the six hops already do. Aphotic's own measures sit elsewhere: traffic never leaves the Tor network, messages are padded up to standard sizes, direct messages carry no sender, there are no typing signals to time, read receipts are off unless you turn them on, the database has no columns for when you signed up or were last online, and queued messages disappear on delivery or after seven days. Against somebody watching both first hops at once, none of that abolishes the attack. Tor doesn't claim to, and neither do we.

Just connecting to Tor puts you on a list.

What's true

Your internet provider can see that you connect to Tor. It cannot see what you do or where you go. Millions of people use Tor every day: journalists, security teams, researchers, and plenty of ordinary readers. In most countries using it is legal and unremarkable.

On a network that actively blocks Tor, Aphotic can connect through a Tor bridge, which disguises the traffic to get through. The app has obfs4, Snowflake and meek bridges built in and takes bridge lines of your own, webtunnel included. Bridges stay off until you turn them on in Settings → Network, or on the first screen if Tor can't connect there. With a bridge on, the bridge sees your IP address in place of the first Tor relay, and with Snowflake or meek so does the volunteer proxy or the CDN in between.

What Aphotic does

Messages, updates and license checks never leave Tor, and there are no push services or analytics. The one exception is a voice call: Tor can't carry live audio reliably, so the audio goes to our call relay over the normal internet, and the app asks you before every call. Outside a call, an observer sees a phone speaking Tor, which looks the same as everybody else's. During one, your internet provider can also see that you're on an Aphotic call.

Tor is too slow for anything serious.

What's true

Six hops cost real time: a couple of seconds per action, up from a few milliseconds. That's what hiding both ends costs, and every hidden service pays it.

What Aphotic does

Aphotic is designed around that delay. Connections are kept warm, anything you send is queued and retried in the background so the app never freezes waiting on the network, and messages keep arriving while the app is closed. Messaging is the one use where Tor's slowness all but disappears day to day, since you were never waiting on a round trip to begin with.

The stack in one view

Defence in depth, layer by layer

No single mechanism carries the weight here.

your phoneencrypted vault · key wrapped by the phone's secure hardware · PIN-only unlock · panic PIN

the messagetwo-layer quantum-resistant setup · AES-256-GCM · no sender on direct messages

its shapepadded to standard sizes · read receipts off by default · no typing signals · call audio at a constant rate

the networkabout 6 Tor hops · Tor built into the app · only call audio leaves it

the servicefull Vanguards protection · proof-of-work at the door under load

the machineinternal-only network · no incoming ports · no identifying headers · 7-day queue

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