What the encryption keeps from us
Some things are out of our hands by design. We can't read your messages, a message's envelope doesn't name its sender, and neither of our databases holds a link between your payment and your chats. Each part below starts with what it does for you and then names the technology, so you can look it up yourself. The last part lists what you have to trust us with.
Protocol
Hybrid post-quantum key agreement
When a conversation starts, the two phones have to agree on a secret key. Aphotic does that twice, with two unrelated kinds of maths, and combines the results; an attacker would have to break both. The first is the standard the internet runs on today. The second is built to resist quantum computers, so recording your traffic now and waiting twenty years for better hardware gets nobody anywhere.
In case you want to look them up: PQXDH, which combines X25519 with ML-KEM-1024, the top strength of the post-quantum standard NIST settled on.
All of it happens on your phone. The server performs none of these steps for you and never sees a private key.
- The messages themselves are encrypted with AES-256-GCM
- Private keys stay on the phone unless you export an encrypted backup or move to a new phone. Even the app's own interface layer cannot reach them
Protocol
Forward secrecy that heals itself
Every message gets its own key, thrown away immediately after use. The keys keep stepping forward as you talk, so somebody who gets hold of your phone today still cannot read what you said yesterday. The conversation also repairs itself: a few messages later the attacker is shut out of what comes next as well.
The stepping-forward part is the well-known Double Ratchet. On top of it, Aphotic mixes a quantum-resistant secret (from ML-KEM-768) in at every step, and that secret keeps the repair holding against a quantum computer too. We call the combination a Triple Ratchet.
- One key per message, used once, then destroyed
- Messages that turn up late or out of order still work, and nothing is weakened to allow it
- A forged or replayed message is dropped and costs the conversation nothing
Identity
Keys you can verify, changes you will notice
The classic attack on any messenger is the server secretly handing you the wrong key so it can read along in the middle. Aphotic makes that swap show: every identity signs its own keys, so a swapped key comes with a signature that doesn't add up. The first time you talk to somebody, the app remembers their identity, and if it ever changes, you get a warning before you carry on.
For the strongest check, read your safety numbers to each other on a phone call or in person. They cover the key exchange from start to finish, so if the numbers match, nobody is sitting in the middle. A community's member list opens the same check for any member who is also one of your contacts.
On your device
A vault built for coercion as well as theft
Everything the app stores sits in an encrypted vault. The key to it is a long random number and is never made from your PIN. It's locked first by your PIN and then again by a non-exportable key in the phone's secure hardware (a dedicated security chip where the phone has one). A stolen copy of the vault file is useless anywhere else, because there is nothing in it to guess at. Photos, videos and voice notes are stored encrypted as well, under keys kept inside the vault, so wiping the vault leaves them unreadable.
Unlocking takes a PIN and nothing else, since someone else can hold your finger or your face to the phone, and a number in your head is far harder to take. Five wrong tries erase the vault. A second PIN wipes everything at once, with no prompt and no warning, and leaves the app on its setup screen. It is meant for the moment someone forces you to open the phone: a robbery, or a partner who insists on reading your messages.
- An optional master passphrase adds a layer that breaking into the secure hardware doesn't shortcut, because each guess at it is built to be slow and memory-hungry
- The vault locks itself on a timer, and whenever the app goes into the background. Locking also clears every decrypted message out of the app's memory
On your device
What the app does about the device itself
Screenshots and screen recording are blocked by Android itself, the vault refuses to be swept into any Android backup, and the code is scrambled to make it hard to read. A watchdog inside the app looks for the tools people use to pry a running program open.
What it looks for, and what it does when it finds something, is the one part of this page we keep to ourselves.
Network
Tor is always on
The chat server has no ordinary web address. It exists only inside Tor, and Tor comes built into the app, so there's nothing extra to install. Your traffic bounces through roughly six machines run by different people, which is why the server never learns your IP address and you never learn where the server is. The server also runs the usual defences against being tracked down or flooded at its entrance.
Then we go after what's left over. Messages are padded up to standard sizes (256 bytes, doubling up to 8 KB, then in 4 KB steps), so their length says little about what's inside, and direct and group messages carry no sender. Looking up a contact's keys or fetching a photo tells the server nothing about who asked, either. The queue forgets everything after 7 days, and the schema has no column for when you signed up or when you were last online.
Timing is the part this leaves open. Someone watching both ends of a Tor connection at once can line them up, and so can the server with what it sees: it decides when to wake a waiting phone, so it can pair a send with a delivery as it happens. While few people use Aphotic, the crowd a sender hides in is small. The protocol page sets out how far that goes, and the real attacks on Tor over the years are written up on their own page, linked in the footer.
- Google and Apple push stays off: asking their push service to wake the app would tell them where the server is and when you use it. Notifications still arrive, raised by the app's own background process over Tor. What they say is your choice: name and message, name only, or nothing
- Replies from the server carry no identifying headers and no version banner to pick the software out by
- Voice calls are the exception: their audio can't ride Tor, so it goes over the normal internet through our call relay. The app says so and asks before every call
Location
Where the servers are
The chat server and the payment node that checks Bitcoin and Monero payments run on separate machines of our own, in data centres in the EU. The relay that carries the audio of voice calls is ours too, also in the EU.
This website runs on a separate machine of its own, also in a locked-down data centre in the EU, with checks on the door and EU data protection law over it. Apart from the call relay, it is the only part of Aphotic with a normal internet address, because a shop has to be findable. Its job is selling licenses and handing out the app; messages never reach it.
Pay with Monero or Bitcoin and none of these machines holds your name, your email address or your IP address. The chat server physically cannot log your IP address: Tor ends the connection before it, so the address never reaches the server or us. This website keeps no visitor log at all. The call relay sees the IP addresses of both people on a call while it runs, and we write none of them down. The transparency page lists, item by item, what the chat server and the shop store.
Payment
Your payment stays apart from your chats
You buy a license with Monero or Bitcoin. The shop then signs a token for you without being able to see it, a bit like signing across a sealed envelope: the signature is valid, but the shop has no idea which token it just approved. Your app hands that token to the chat server, which checks the signature and lets you in without learning which license it came from. Neither database has a field that could link who paid to who chats, and no calculation matches the blinded token the shop signed to the one the chat server accepts. Someone running both services could try to pair the two by timing, which gets harder the more people use Aphotic.
Trust
What you have to trust us with
The app's full source code isn't public, and its builds aren't reproducible, so nobody outside can confirm that the app you install was built from the code we describe. The protocol page shows the functions that do the encryption, cut from the source when this site is built, and nothing beyond them.
We sign every update with keys the app checks before it installs anything, and an update installs only after you tap it. Those keys are ours, so an update could change what the app does. The app fetches the list of updates without saying who is asking, so the server cannot tell whose phone it is serving.
On the server, what is kept and for how long is our design and our word. The transparency page lists all of it. Sealed sender and Tor limit what the server can see in the first place, and timing is the part they leave open.
Why these features do not exist
Each one is a security decision, with its reason written out.
Messages take seconds
The wait comes from the six machines your traffic bounces through, the same hops that hide both ends. Tapping send never holds you up, though, because delivery happens in the background.
One device, one identity
Your identity is live on one phone at a time, so there is no sync service for anyone to break into. Moving to a new phone is a deliberate encrypted handover, and an encrypted backup file holds a copy of your keys only if you export one.
Small groups stay pairwise
Everyday groups stop at 20 people and each message is encrypted separately for every member, so the server holds no group key. Communities go up to 5,000 and switch to a shared key the members work out among themselves, redone every time somebody joins or leaves, and the server never sees that key either.
Calls leave Tor
Tor can't carry live audio reliably, so the audio of a call travels the normal internet through a call relay we run in the EU. Your contact only ever sees the relay, never your IP address. The relay sees both IP addresses and how long the call lasts, and it never learns who you are or what you say, because it holds no key to the audio. The app asks before every call, and only contacts you've accepted can ring you.
Android-first
Aphotic runs on Android alone, so built-in Tor, the hardware-backed vault and background delivery get done properly on one platform.
The public specifications behind it
Every building block Aphotic uses is public and has a name. Each one is linked below.