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Fuck Chat Control.

The EU wants a wiretap in every pocket and calls it child protection. This page covers what happened on 9 July 2026, why the thing sold as a safety measure is a surveillance machine, and why Aphotic is built so we physically cannot comply.

Let's be blunt, because the people pushing this have spent four years being anything but. “Chat Control” is the plan to make your phone search your private messages, photos and links against a government list before you are even allowed to send them, and to report you when the machine thinks it found something.

It targets everyone, guilty or not, down to the last message, and nobody has to be under suspicion first. That makes it a permanent search of 450 million people on the off chance. Democracies used to call that unlawful; the EU is about to call it Tuesday.

the newest update

9 July 2026: they brought the snooping law back from the dead

The “voluntary” scanning regime (Chat Control 1.0, the exemption that lets US platforms scan your messages at all) was supposed to run out. On 9 July 2026 the European Parliament could have rejected the Council's fast-tracked extension, which took an absolute majority of 361 MEPs. Only 314 voted to kill it.

So suspicionless scanning of private communications is green-lit until 2028. The “temporary, voluntary” exception, first sold in 2021, has just been renewed again.

The bigger threat is the permanent, compulsory version (CSAR, “Chat Control 2.0”), still grinding through closed-door negotiations between Parliament, Council and Commission. The supposedly final round on 29 June 2026 collapsed over one issue: the Council's insistence on scanning everyone. The file now passes to the Irish Council presidency, and they will try again, as they have every time before.

MEPs voted to reject; 361 were needed
314

MEPs voted to reject; 361 were needed

mass scanning now runs until
2028

mass scanning now runs until

people to be searched, suspicion-free
450M

people to be searched, suspicion-free

what it does

They left the encryption alone and moved the wiretap onto your phone.

The trick in Chat Control 2.0 is called client-side scanning: the search runs on your phone itself. Your messenger reads your message, reduces it to a fingerprint and checks that against a government-supplied list, all before the message is encrypted. “We never touched the encryption,” they say, which is true and beside the point once the informant sits inside the envelope with you.

Once that scanner exists, it is a general-purpose surveillance tool. The list it checks against is secret: today it holds fingerprints of child abuse images, tomorrow a leaked document, a protest flyer, a banned symbol or a political meme, and nobody will tell you what was added. More than 500 cryptographers and security researchers have put it more plainly: this cannot be built safely, and it breaks the security everyone else relies on.

  • It scans content before encryption. “End-to-end encrypted” turns into a marketing label while a copy gets checked on your device.
  • It is suspicionless and permanent, with no warrant and no off switch.
  • It builds a client-side back door that hackers and hostile governments will find and abuse.
  • False positives are your problem: a machine flags your private photo, and a stranger reviews it.

the part that should make you angry

“For the children”, except the people writing it exempted themselves

Every mass-surveillance law wears a child on its cover. Nobody is against protecting kids, which is what makes it such a useful crowbar: object to the method and you get called an accomplice. Protecting children means paying for investigators, hotlines and prevention. Strip-searching a continent's private life and hoping does none of that.

Earlier drafts of this same regulation carved out the “professional” accounts of police, military and intelligence, so the communications of the powerful stay private while yours get scanned. If suspicionless scanning is safe enough for you, why not for them? They know exactly what it is, and they kept the encryption for themselves.

A dragnet this wide catches everyone except the people it names. Anyone trafficking abuse material moves to custom tools the moment a mandate lands, and what stays in the net is you: your family photos, your medical questions, your nudes, your arguments, your union chat, your therapist.

the constitutional case

In Germany this is flatly unconstitutional.

The Grundgesetz does not leave this to a majority in Brussels. Article 10 guarantees the secrecy of telecommunications, the Fernmeldegeheimnis: the confidentiality of what you write and to whom. Client-side scanning reads your message before it is sealed and checks it against a state list, on everyone, forever, which amounts to searching your correspondence on your own phone.

In 2008 the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) created a fundamental right for this situation: the right to the confidentiality and integrity of information-technology systems, the so-called IT-Grundrecht, drawn from Art. 2(1) together with Art. 1(1) GG. Conscripting your own device to scan you and report you is the scenario that right was written to forbid.

The Volkszählungsurteil of 1983 established the right to informational self-determination and held that the state may not create a climate in which no one knows who knows what about them. German data retention, anlasslose Massenüberwachung (dragnet surveillance with no cause), has fallen twice since: the Bundesverfassungsgericht struck down the first law in 2010, and the Court of Justice of the EU ruled its successor incompatible with EU law in 2022. A scan that runs across everyone's private messages is designed to produce that climate.

Some lines even a majority cannot cross. Human dignity (Art. 1) and the absolutely protected core area of private life mean there is an inner zone the state may never enter, and a scanner that reads everything necessarily reaches into it. Art. 19(2) adds that the essence of a fundamental right must never be touched. Yes, this is an EU regulation, but Germany's government is bound by the Grundgesetz when it votes in the Council, and the Constitutional Court has reserved the power to reject EU acts that breach Germany's constitutional identity. A minister who waves this through answers to the Grundgesetz, whatever Brussels decides.

The rights it runs straight over

Art. 10 GG
Secrecy of telecommunications (Fernmeldegeheimnis)
Art. 2(1) + 1(1) GG
Confidentiality & integrity of IT systems (the 2008 IT-Grundrecht) and informational self-determination
Art. 1(1) GG
Human dignity & the untouchable core of private life
Art. 19(2) GG
The essence of a basic right is inviolable

where Aphotic stands

We built Aphotic without a “scan your users” button.

The scheme leans on a short list of choke points: the app stores, the big US platforms, and a company willing to ship an update that turns the scanner on. We designed Aphotic to stay clear of all three.

We cannot put a scanner in your pocket without you seeing it. The giants can, and that difference comes from how Aphotic is built:

  • No app store in the way. Aphotic is a signed file you download here and check yourself, by fingerprint and by signature. A Google Play listing is coming for convenience, alongside the direct download. Pull the listing and the download carries on untouched, as does every phone that already has the app.
  • No Google or Apple services underneath. We sign updates, and the app checks them against a key baked into it. The hooks Android offers for waking apps and for scanning their content aren't connected to anything.
  • The server knows almost nothing: sealed sender keeps the sender off direct text messages, it holds no phone number or email address, and its message queue clears after 7 days. Tor runs at both ends, and there is no ordinary web address anyone could serve a scanning order to.
  • Open to inspection. The app can be examined and the encryption runs on your own phone, so a scanner hidden in it would be visible to anyone who went looking.

The caveat

No messenger can save you from a scanner baked into the phone's operating system, which is why this law has to be killed at the source. An app can refuse to be the wiretap, stay outside the app-store choke points and keep the keys on your device. Vote, call your MEP, and in the meantime, own your stack.

Take your privacy out of their hands.

Aphotic keeps the message and the keys on your device, and the PIN in your head. The server stays blind, and no vote in Brussels can change that.

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