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How Aphotic compares

Signal, Telegram, Threema, Session, SimpleX and the peer-to-peer messengers such as Briar are all serious projects. This page looks at what each one guarantees by the way it is built, and at the few things only Aphotic does.

How we did this: we compare only what each app guarantees by the way it is built and leave its advertising claims out. Every mark in the table can be checked against public documentation, and the sources are listed underneath.

Checked in August 2026, SimpleX in September 2026, Session's servers in October 2026 and the source, audit and build rows in November 2026, against public documentation, with the sources listed under the table. Spot something out of date? Tell us and we will correct it in the open. Report an error →

At a glance

Six verdicts

Signal

The reference everyone else gets measured against: open source, run by a US non-profit. It is tied to your phone number, though, and it connects over the ordinary internet, so the servers can see where you are.

→ Choose Aphotic if you want to sign up without a phone number or an email address, or want the server itself hidden behind Tor and the sender hidden on every direct text message, including the first one from a stranger.

Telegram

A messenger packed with features and enormous groups, where the company can read your ordinary chats. Only the chats it calls secret chats are encrypted end to end.

→ Choose Aphotic if you want everything encrypted end to end without switching anything on, and no sender on the envelope of a direct text message.

Threema

A mature paid messenger from Switzerland that lets you have an anonymous ID. The connection underneath is ordinary, though, so the servers still see your IP address.

→ Choose Aphotic for every message over Tor, senders hidden by default, a Monero payment that no database links to your chat identity, and a vault built for the day somebody makes you unlock your phone.

Session

The closest neighbour in spirit: no phone number, onion-routed by default, spread over many independent nodes. To get there it gave up the protection that keeps old messages safe if your keys are ever stolen.

→ Choose Aphotic if you want keys that keep moving, so a break-in today does not open yesterday and the conversation repairs itself afterwards. You also get self-deleting messages the server cannot interfere with, and a panic PIN.

SimpleX

No identifier of any kind, not even a random one. Every contact gets its own pair of one-way message queues, so there is nothing to look you up by. It is free, open source, has calls and runs on every platform. Its relays sit on the ordinary internet, and Tor is a setting you switch on yourself.

→ Choose Aphotic if you want Tor underneath everything with nothing to configure, and servers that have no ordinary web address at all. You also get communities of up to 5,000 people under one shared key, and a vault with a panic PIN built for the day somebody makes you unlock your phone.

Peer-to-peer messengers such as Briar

There is no server anywhere. Each phone runs its own Tor onion service and talks straight to the other phone, and the apps are free and open source, with a Bluetooth mesh for the days the internet is down. Nothing central exists that could leak or go offline. The price is that both phones have to be online at the same moment for a message to arrive, unless you run your own always-on mailbox device, and the onion address you connect from is your identity, so the device on the other end knows exactly who reached it.

→ Choose Aphotic if a message has to arrive while the other phone is switched off, held encrypted on our own servers in the EU for up to seven days, with sealed sender, so the envelope carries no sender for the relay to read. You also get groups under one shared key that scale to 5,000 people, where a removed member is removed by the encryption itself.

Dimension by dimension

The comparison table

Identifier required

Aphotic
None (ID derived from your keys)
Signal
Phone number
Telegram
Phone number
Threema
None (random ID)
Session
None (derived ID)
SimpleX
None at all, not even a random ID. Each contact gets its own pair of one-way queues
Peer-to-peer (Briar)
None; your device's onion address is the identity

Transport

Aphotic
Messages over Tor only, hidden service
Signal
TLS to central servers
Telegram
TLS to cloud DCs
Threema
TLS to Swiss servers
Session
Onion-routed (Lokinet)
SimpleX
TLS to relays that you and your contact each pick. A second relay forwards what you send, so the receiving side never sees your IP address. Your own relay still does, unless you switch Tor on
Peer-to-peer (Briar)
A Tor onion service on each phone, device to device, plus a Bluetooth mesh when the internet is down

Offline delivery

Aphotic
Held encrypted on the relay for up to 7 days
Signal
Queued on the server until you reconnect
Telegram
Kept in the cloud
Threema
Queued on the server until delivery
Session
Held by the storage nodes for a limited window
SimpleX
Held encrypted on the relay until delivered, for up to 21 days⁸
Peer-to-peer (Briar)
Both phones have to be online at the same moment, unless you run your own always-on mailbox device

Jurisdiction & exposure

Aphotic
No ordinary web address; our own servers in the EU
Signal
US nonprofit; centralized clearnet servers
Telegram
Dubai HQ; closed-source server, distributed DCs
Threema
Swiss company; own data centre in Zurich
Session
Decentralized node swarm for messages; a central file server for attachments¹⁰
SimpleX
UK company running the preset relays on the ordinary internet. You can pick other relays or host your own
Peer-to-peer (Briar)
No servers at all, and no company running them

What the operator holds

Aphotic
Public keys, Community membership and unreadable data (groups live on the phones); the message queue clears after 7 days, a Community with saved history keeps longer. Shop orders with amount, transaction ID and dates, with no buyer identity. No stored signup or last-seen times
Signal
Phone number; registration date + last-connection date¹
Telegram
Phone number; ordinary chats, the messages themselves, readable by the company
Threema
ID creation date, last login, hash of linked phone/email if any²
Session
No central message server; storage nodes hold ciphertext briefly. The Session Technology Foundation runs the file server for encrypted attachments and a push server that sees the account ID of anyone using fast notifications¹⁰
SimpleX
No accounts or profiles. The relays hold encrypted queues and do not log IP addresses⁸
Peer-to-peer (Briar)
No operator. The data lives on the phones

E2EE by default

Aphotic
Always
Signal
Always
Telegram
Secret chats only³
Threema
Always
Session
Always
SimpleX
Always
Peer-to-peer (Briar)
Always

Sender metadata

Aphotic
Sealed sender by default
Signal
Sealed sender, partly opt-in⁴
Telegram
Yes, the operator sees it
Threema
Visible, minimal retention
Session
No, hidden by onion routing
SimpleX
No user IDs exist, and sent and received traffic share nothing a relay could match up
Peer-to-peer (Briar)
The device you reach sees which identity connected, and no server sits in between to see anything

Forward secrecy

Aphotic
Triple Ratchet (Double + PQ)
Signal
Triple Ratchet (Double + PQ)
Telegram
Secret chats only
Threema
Yes (Ibex)
Session
No, given up to allow several devices⁵
SimpleX
Double ratchet, with a post-quantum step in direct chats
Peer-to-peer (Briar)
A ratchet per message, over a per-contact root key that stays the same across reconnects

Post-quantum key agreement

Aphotic
Hybrid PQXDH + continuous PQ ratchet
Signal
Hybrid PQXDH + continuous PQ ratchet⁶
Telegram
No
Threema
No
Session
No
SimpleX
Hybrid sntrup761 on every ratchet step, in direct chats⁹
Peer-to-peer (Briar)
Hybrid ML-KEM-768 with X25519 when you pair

Disappearing messages

Aphotic
Direct messages and everyday groups, 30 s to 7 days, timer inside the encryption; none in Communities
Signal
Yes, incl. groups
Telegram
Secret chats / cloud timers
Threema
Limited
Session
Yes
SimpleX
Yes
Peer-to-peer (Briar)
Yes

Payment kept apart from chat identity

Aphotic
Yes. Licenses are redeemed as blind-signed tokens, so no stored record or token links the purchase to your chat identity. While users are few, timing could pair them
Signal
n/a (free, donations)
Telegram
Premium tied to account
Threema
The Threema Shop for Android takes Bitcoin or cash by post. App-store purchases run under your billing name
Session
n/a (free)
SimpleX
n/a (free)
Peer-to-peer (Briar)
n/a (free)

Business model

Aphotic
You buy a license with crypto. Nothing is made from your data
Signal
Non-profit, donations
Telegram
Premium + ads
Threema
One-time paid app
Session
Free, token-incentivized nodes
SimpleX
Free and AGPL. A company funded by investors and donations
Peer-to-peer (Briar)
Free and GPL, with no company in the loop

Group size

Aphotic
20 per group, encrypted for each member; Communities up to 5,000
Signal
1,000
Telegram
200,000 (no E2EE)
Threema
~256
Session
~100
SimpleX
Your phone sends to each member. Large groups are still in development
Peer-to-peer (Briar)
Small groups. Your phone sends a copy to each member, every member has to be one of your own contacts, and there is no shared group key, so removing someone rests on the other members obeying it

Calls

Aphotic
1:1 voice through our own relay in the EU. The audio leaves Tor, and the app asks before every call
Signal
Voice + video, groups
Telegram
Voice + video
Threema
Voice + video
Session
Limited
SimpleX
Voice + video
Peer-to-peer (Briar)
Briar has none; some forks add them

Multi-device

Aphotic
One device on purpose. Your identity is live on one phone at a time
Signal
Native linking
Telegram
Full cloud sync
Threema
Yes (leader device)
Session
Seed-based restore
SimpleX
One device holds the profile. The desktop app can drive the one on your phone
Peer-to-peer (Briar)
One device, because the identity is that device's onion address

Platforms

Aphotic
Android only
Signal
iOS, Android, desktop
Telegram
Everything + web
Threema
iOS, Android, desktop
Session
iOS, Android, desktop
SimpleX
iOS, Android, desktop, terminal
Peer-to-peer (Briar)
Android, and a desktop client

Source code

Aphotic
Not public. The protocol page shows the encryption functions
Signal
Client and server open source (AGPL-3.0); the server's spam filter is kept private¹¹
Telegram
Clients open source (GPL-2.0); server code not published¹²
Threema
Apps open source (AGPL-3.0); server code not published
Session
Client (GPL-3.0) and the nodes' storage server (MIT) open source
SimpleX
Client and server open source (AGPL-3.0)
Peer-to-peer (Briar)
Open source (GPL-3.0), with no server

Independent security audit

Aphotic
None yet
Signal
Independent academic analyses of the protocol (2017, 2023)¹³
Telegram
Independent academic analyses of the protocol (2022, 2025)¹⁴
Threema
Cure53 (apps 2020, desktop 2024)¹⁵
Session
Quarkslab, 2021¹⁶
SimpleX
Trail of Bits (implementation 2022, design review 2024)¹⁷
Peer-to-peer (Briar)
Radically Open Security (2023), Cure53 (2017)¹⁸

Reproducible Android builds

Aphotic
No
Signal
Yes, documented¹⁹
Telegram
Documented, and called experimental²⁰
Threema
Documented, and called experimental²¹
Session
None documented²²
SimpleX
Yes, for the release APKs on GitHub²³
Peer-to-peer (Briar)
Yes, with its own reproducer tool²⁴
AphoticSignalTelegramThreemaSessionSimpleXPeer-to-peer (Briar)
Identifier requiredNone (ID derived from your keys)Phone numberPhone numberNone (random ID)None (derived ID)None at all, not even a random ID. Each contact gets its own pair of one-way queuesNone; your device's onion address is the identity
TransportMessages over Tor only, hidden serviceTLS to central serversTLS to cloud DCsTLS to Swiss serversOnion-routed (Lokinet)TLS to relays that you and your contact each pick. A second relay forwards what you send, so the receiving side never sees your IP address. Your own relay still does, unless you switch Tor onA Tor onion service on each phone, device to device, plus a Bluetooth mesh when the internet is down
Offline deliveryHeld encrypted on the relay for up to 7 daysQueued on the server until you reconnectKept in the cloudQueued on the server until deliveryHeld by the storage nodes for a limited windowHeld encrypted on the relay until delivered, for up to 21 days⁸Both phones have to be online at the same moment, unless you run your own always-on mailbox device
Jurisdiction & exposureNo ordinary web address; our own servers in the EUUS nonprofit; centralized clearnet serversDubai HQ; closed-source server, distributed DCsSwiss company; own data centre in ZurichDecentralized node swarm for messages; a central file server for attachments¹⁰UK company running the preset relays on the ordinary internet. You can pick other relays or host your ownNo servers at all, and no company running them
What the operator holdsPublic keys, Community membership and unreadable data (groups live on the phones); the message queue clears after 7 days, a Community with saved history keeps longer. Shop orders with amount, transaction ID and dates, with no buyer identity. No stored signup or last-seen timesPhone number; registration date + last-connection date¹Phone number; ordinary chats, the messages themselves, readable by the companyID creation date, last login, hash of linked phone/email if any²No central message server; storage nodes hold ciphertext briefly. The Session Technology Foundation runs the file server for encrypted attachments and a push server that sees the account ID of anyone using fast notifications¹⁰No accounts or profiles. The relays hold encrypted queues and do not log IP addresses⁸No operator. The data lives on the phones
E2EE by defaultAlwaysAlwaysSecret chats only³AlwaysAlwaysAlwaysAlways
Sender metadataSealed sender by defaultSealed sender, partly opt-in⁴Yes, the operator sees itVisible, minimal retentionNo, hidden by onion routingNo user IDs exist, and sent and received traffic share nothing a relay could match upThe device you reach sees which identity connected, and no server sits in between to see anything
Forward secrecyTriple Ratchet (Double + PQ)Triple Ratchet (Double + PQ)Secret chats onlyYes (Ibex)No, given up to allow several devices⁵Double ratchet, with a post-quantum step in direct chatsA ratchet per message, over a per-contact root key that stays the same across reconnects
Post-quantum key agreementHybrid PQXDH + continuous PQ ratchetHybrid PQXDH + continuous PQ ratchet⁶NoNoNoHybrid sntrup761 on every ratchet step, in direct chats⁹Hybrid ML-KEM-768 with X25519 when you pair
Disappearing messagesDirect messages and everyday groups, 30 s to 7 days, timer inside the encryption; none in CommunitiesYes, incl. groupsSecret chats / cloud timersLimitedYesYesYes
Payment kept apart from chat identityYes. Licenses are redeemed as blind-signed tokens, so no stored record or token links the purchase to your chat identity. While users are few, timing could pair themn/a (free, donations)Premium tied to accountThe Threema Shop for Android takes Bitcoin or cash by post. App-store purchases run under your billing namen/a (free)n/a (free)n/a (free)
Business modelYou buy a license with crypto. Nothing is made from your dataNon-profit, donationsPremium + adsOne-time paid appFree, token-incentivized nodesFree and AGPL. A company funded by investors and donationsFree and GPL, with no company in the loop
Group size20 per group, encrypted for each member; Communities up to 5,0001,000200,000 (no E2EE)~256~100Your phone sends to each member. Large groups are still in developmentSmall groups. Your phone sends a copy to each member, every member has to be one of your own contacts, and there is no shared group key, so removing someone rests on the other members obeying it
Calls1:1 voice through our own relay in the EU. The audio leaves Tor, and the app asks before every callVoice + video, groupsVoice + videoVoice + videoLimitedVoice + videoBriar has none; some forks add them
Multi-deviceOne device on purpose. Your identity is live on one phone at a timeNative linkingFull cloud syncYes (leader device)Seed-based restoreOne device holds the profile. The desktop app can drive the one on your phoneOne device, because the identity is that device's onion address
PlatformsAndroid onlyiOS, Android, desktopEverything + webiOS, Android, desktopiOS, Android, desktopiOS, Android, desktop, terminalAndroid, and a desktop client
Source codeNot public. The protocol page shows the encryption functionsClient and server open source (AGPL-3.0); the server's spam filter is kept private¹¹Clients open source (GPL-2.0); server code not published¹²Apps open source (AGPL-3.0); server code not publishedClient (GPL-3.0) and the nodes' storage server (MIT) open sourceClient and server open source (AGPL-3.0)Open source (GPL-3.0), with no server
Independent security auditNone yetIndependent academic analyses of the protocol (2017, 2023)¹³Independent academic analyses of the protocol (2022, 2025)¹⁴Cure53 (apps 2020, desktop 2024)¹⁵Quarkslab, 2021¹⁶Trail of Bits (implementation 2022, design review 2024)¹⁷Radically Open Security (2023), Cure53 (2017)¹⁸
Reproducible Android buildsNoYes, documented¹⁹Documented, and called experimental²⁰Documented, and called experimental²¹None documented²²Yes, for the release APKs on GitHub²³Yes, with its own reproducer tool²⁴
  1. 1Signal's published record of government requests: asked about a phone number, the only account data it can produce is the date the account was registered and the date it last connected. signal.org/bigbrother/
  2. 2Threema's transparency report lists what it can hand over: when the ID was created, when it last logged in, and a scrambled form of any linked phone number or email address. threema.com/en/transparency-report
  3. 3Telegram's own FAQ: end-to-end encryption covers secret chats and calls. Ordinary chats are encrypted only between your phone and Telegram's servers, which means Telegram can read them. telegram.org/faq#q-how-are-secret-chats-different
  4. 4Signal's own announcement of sealed sender: on by default between saved contacts, while accepting it from strangers is a setting you have to switch on. signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/
  5. 5Session's whitepaper describes the deliberate move to long-lived keys, giving up the per-message protection in exchange for working on several devices and delivering while you are offline. arxiv.org/abs/2002.04609
  6. 6The PQXDH specification, which both Aphotic and Signal implement, is public. signal.org/docs/specifications/pqxdh/
  7. 7Briar's own documentation on how messages travel: phone to phone over Tor, Wi-Fi or Bluetooth, with an optional mailbox device you host yourself for delivery while a contact is offline. briarproject.org/how-it-works/
  8. 8SimpleX's privacy policy: no user accounts, messages removed from the preset relays on delivery or after 21 days, no IP address logging, operated by a UK company. simplex.chat/privacy/
  9. 9SimpleX's own announcement of its post-quantum double ratchet: Streamlined NTRU Prime (sntrup761) alongside the classical exchange, in direct chats. simplex.chat/blog/20240314-simplex-chat-v5-6-quantum-resistance-signal-double-ratchet-algorithm.html
  10. 10Session's FAQ: attachments go to the Session File Server, run by the Session Technology Foundation, and fast-mode notifications pass the account ID and push token to a push server the foundation runs. getsession.org/faq
  11. 11Signal publishes its server, except the spam-filtering part, whose interfaces are public and whose implementation is not. signal.org/blog/keeping-spam-off-signal/
  12. 12Telegram's FAQ on why it does not publish its server code. telegram.org/faq
  13. 13Independent formal analyses of the Signal protocol: Cohn-Gordon et al. (IEEE EuroS&P 2017) and Cremers et al. (USENIX Security 2023). eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013
  14. 14Independent analyses of Telegram's MTProto by Albrecht et al.: IEEE S&P 2022 and Eurocrypt 2025. eprint.iacr.org/2023/469
  15. 15Threema's list of code audits, with the Cure53 reports. threema.com/en/faq/code-audit
  16. 16Session's FAQ links its 2021 audit by Quarkslab. getsession.org/faq
  17. 17SimpleX's security page lists its reviews by Trail of Bits. simplex.chat/security/
  18. 18Briar's audit by Radically Open Security, carried out in 2023 and published by the Open Technology Fund. opentech.fund/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/report_briar-android.pdf
  19. 19Signal's instructions for reproducing its Android builds. github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/tree/main/reproducible-builds
  20. 20Telegram's page on reproducible builds, which calls the feature experimental. core.telegram.org/reproducible-builds
  21. 21Threema's instructions for reproducing its Android builds, described as experimental. threema.com/en/open-source/reproducible-builds
  22. 22Session's release notes for Android describe signature and checksum checks of the release files and no way to rebuild them. github.com/session-foundation/session-android/blob/dev/RELEASE.md
  23. 23SimpleX's instructions for reproducing its Android release APKs. simplex.chat/reproduce/
  24. 24Briar's reproducer tool, which rebuilds the official APK and compares it bit for bit. code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-reproducer

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